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A CHILD LITIGANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Kevin Lapp*
As the Supreme Court put it a half century ago, the right to
counsel for juveniles reflects “society’s special concern for children”
and “is of the essence of justice.” In a variety of legal proceedings,
from delinquency matters to child welfare proceedings to judicial
bypass hearings, the law requires the appointment of counsel to child
litigants. While coherent in the whole, the law regarding counsel for
child litigants is a patchwork of state and federal constitutional
rulings by courts and statutory grants. Legal scholarship about a child
litigant’s right to counsel is similarly fragmented. Predominantly,
legal scholars have examined arguments for a child litigant’s right to
counsel at government expense by focusing on a particular kind of
proceeding.
This Article offers a unified theory for a child litigant’s right
to counsel at government expense that spans judicial proceedings. In
legal proceedings where significant legal rights or interests are at
stake, fairness demands that child litigants have a right to counsel at
government expense in those proceedings. In the main, the law
coheres with the theory proposed here. However, one type of
proceeding involving tens of thousands of juveniles annually with
tremendous consequences stands as an unjustifiable outlier –
immigration removal (deportation) proceedings.

* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
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INTRODUCTION
In immigration removal (deportation) proceedings, respondents
do not have a right to counsel at government expense.1 Each year, as
many as a hundred thousand or more people represent themselves in
these proceedings.2 The number includes tens of thousands of
respondents under the age of eighteen.3 Jack Weil, a federal
immigration judge who was responsible for training other immigration
judges, was recently asked during a deposition if there were some
respondents in immigration court so young that they would not be able
to understand the court proceedings.4 He insisted it was a case-by-case
determination.5 In explaining why a judge could allow a removal
hearing against an unrepresented child to go forward, he averred that
“I’ve taught immigration law literally to three year olds and four year
olds. It takes a lot of time. It takes a lot of patience. They get it. It’s
not the most efficient, but it can be done.”6 Judge Weil doubled down
later in the deposition. When asked if there were any cases involving
children where the only way to ensure that the child received a fair
hearing was either to stop the proceeding or provide counsel, he
reiterated, “I have trained three year olds and four year olds in
immigration law. You can do a fair hearing [without providing the
child with a lawyer].”7
The judge’s claim is hard to take seriously. As legal and child
psychology experts remarked after learning of Judge Weil’s
testimony, key developmental milestones for three- and four-year-olds
include saying simple sentences and building towers of blocks.8 At the
same time, immigration law is notoriously inscrutable.9 According to
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012).
2. Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(Nov. 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta/.
3. Juveniles — Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(June 8, 2014), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/juvenile/.
4. Transcript of Deposition of Honorable Jack H. Weil, J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026
(9th Cir. 2016) (No. 2:14-cv-01026-TSZ), at 69:18–22.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 69:24–70:3.
7. Id. at 160:13–161:12.
8. Jerry Markon, Can a 3-Year Old Represent Herself in Immigration Court? This Judge
Thinks So, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/can-a-3-year-old-represent-herself-in-immigration-court-this-judge-thinksso/2016/03/03/5be59a32-db25-11e5-925f-1d10062cc82d_story.html?utm_term=.b69ad5822554.
9. Baltazar-Alcazar v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004)
(stating that courts have repeatedly recognized that the immigration laws are “second only to the
Internal Revenue Code in complexity”).
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the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “[a] lawyer is often the only person
who [can] thread the [immigration-law] labyrinth.”10 Yet, Judge
Weil’s insistence on the fairness of adversarial removal proceedings
against unrepresented children reflects prevailing due process law.11
This conflicts with a broad national consensus that child litigants
should be appointed counsel in legal proceedings. As the Supreme
Court put it a half century ago, the right to counsel for juveniles
reflects “society’s special concern for children” and “is of the essence
of justice.”12 In a variety of civil proceedings, from delinquency
matters to child welfare proceedings to judicial bypass hearings, the
law requires the appointment of counsel to child litigants.13
While coherent in the whole, the law regarding counsel for child
litigants is a patchwork of state and federal constitutional rulings by
courts and statutory grants. This mishmash is partly the result of the
right developing haphazardly. Sometimes, legislation created the
right. Other times, litigation resulted in court rulings that child litigants
are entitled to counsel at government expense. Always, the right has
expanded one kind of legal proceeding at a time. And though there
have been occasional delays and a rare dead end here and there, the
right has steadily expanded since a juvenile litigant’s due process right
to appointed counsel was first recognized over half a century ago.14
Legal scholarship about a child litigant’s right to counsel is
similarly fragmented. Predominantly, legal scholars have examined
arguments for a child litigant’s right to counsel at government expense
by focusing on a particular kind of proceeding.15 This scholarship
invariably makes its case for appointed counsel within the prevailing
framework of the Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)16 due process balancing
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that non-citizens have a due process right to secure counsel of their choice, but at their own
expense).
12. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 561 (1966).
13. See infra, Part II.
14. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (holding that juveniles have a due process right to counsel at transfer
hearings to determine whether a juvenile’s case would go forward in criminal rather than juvenile
court); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967) (holding that juveniles have a due process right to
counsel at the adjudication stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings).
15. See, e.g., Benjamin Good, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 109 (2014); Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency
Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 663 (2006); Julie K. Waterstone, Counsel in School Exclusion
Cases: Leveling the Playing Field, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 471 (2016).
16. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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test, which narrows the focus to the stakes, interests, and procedures
of a particular type of proceeding.17 What is lacking in the literature is
a unified theory for a child litigant’s right to counsel at government
expense that spans judicial proceedings.
This Article attempts to offer such a theory. Because the theory
addresses the fairness of proceedings involving juvenile litigants writ
large, it eschews a three-part Mathews inquiry. Nor is the theory
tethered to particular empirical findings from neuroscience, adolescent
brain development, or developmental psychology.18 That research
undoubtedly supports the theory of appointed counsel for child
litigants advanced here.19 But as the Supreme Court recently observed,
the differences between children and adults are generally known
“commonsense propositions,” which “the literature confirms” but for
which “citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is
unnecessary.”20 Moreover, differences beyond cognitive capacities—
such as a child’s presumptive lack of financial resources to hire
counsel, and the government’s parens patriae obligation toward
children—inform the theory as well.
The theory is quite simple. In legal proceedings where significant
legal rights or interests are at stake, fairness demands that a child
litigant have a right to counsel at government expense in those
proceedings.21 The theory is grounded in the core value of fairness and
the longstanding accommodation in the law of stable and enduring
truths about the differences between children and adults.22
17. See, e.g., Pitchal, supra note 15, at 695 (2006) (“Though criticized, Mathews has been
widely accepted by courts and repeatedly applied by the Supreme Court, so advocates have no
choice but to filter arguments through its rubric.”). Mathews v. Eldridge identified a three-part
balancing test for determining whether a proceeding comported with due process, including (1) the
private interest at stake in the proceedings; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
under current procedures and the likelihood that additional or substitute procedural safeguards
would reduce that risk; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative
burdens that a proposed procedural safeguard would impose. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
18. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF.
L. REV. 1447 (2009) (examining empirical studies in the area of procedural justice theory and
urging courts to allow social science research related to adolescents and conceptions of procedural
justice to inform the decision of whether juveniles should get certain procedural rights).
19. See infra, Part I.
20. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 n.5 (2011); see also Martin Guggenheim &
Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 109, 154 (2012) (noting that “Justice Sotomayor shifted the focus from the realm of
social science to what she termed “commonsense propositions” about the nature of adolescence”).
21. The theory does not encompass civil matters between private parties.
22. Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 201 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014).
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The theory is outlined in Part I. Answering whether child litigants
should be entitled to counsel at government expense involves two
simple questions: (1) are significant interests at stake in the
proceedings?; and (2) is the litigant before the court a minor? If the
answer to both is yes, then fairness demands that the government
provide the child litigant with counsel.
Part II lays out the current legal landscape of a child litigant’s
right to appointed counsel. In the main, the law coheres with the
theory.23 Part III identifies one type of proceeding involving tens of
thousands of juveniles annually with tremendous consequences that
stands as an outlier—immigration removal (deportation) proceedings.
This Part explains why child respondents in removal proceedings
should be provided with counsel as a matter of due process.
PART I: A COMMON SENSE THEORY OF A RIGHT TO APPOINTED
COUNSEL FOR CHILD LITIGANTS
Few would assert with a straight face that a legal proceeding that
could result in the detention of a juvenile, the separation of the juvenile
from her family, or the denial of a juvenile’s right to make
reproductive choices—whatever the young person’s age—could be
fair if the juvenile did not have the benefit of legal counsel. That
commonsense proposition undergirds the theory of a right to
appointed counsel for child litigants asserted here. Children are
different from adults in well-known ways relevant to their need for
counsel in judicial proceedings, and those differences are shared by
juveniles generally. As a result, proceedings impacting a child’s
significant interest are fair only when the child is provided with
counsel. This holds whatever the administrative or financial burdens
the requirement of appointed counsel for child litigants might impose.
This Part first explains why a rule demanding appointed counsel
for child litigants is a matter of common sense, buttressed by
developmental research about the cognitive capacities of children and
adolescents. It then explains why the theory calls for a categorical right
23. That does not mean that all jurisdictions fully ensure that child litigants do not proceed
unrepresented. As the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention recently observed,
provisions for waiver of counsel, “paired with limited internal oversight of juvenile indigent
defense practices, can leave youth legally unrepresented.” OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION,
LITERATURE
REVIEW: INDIGENT DEFENSE FOR JUVENILES 3 (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/In
digent-Defense-for-Juveniles.pdf.

(9) 52.4_LAPP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

A CHILD LITIGANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1/6/2020 4:41 PM

469

to counsel, and not a case-by-case inquiry into individual
circumstances. Finally, it defines “significant interests” to include
long- and oft-recognized liberty and property interests, as well as a
child’s right to family integrity.
A. Common Sense
The idea that juveniles are different from adults and demand
different legal standards is neither new nor controversial. The law has
long accounted for the reality that juveniles “characteristically lack the
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete
ability to understand the world around them.”24 From age-related
driving and alcohol rules to restrictions on the enforceability of
contracts entered into with minors25 and innumerable other provisions,
laws safeguard juveniles from their own vulnerabilities.26 Indeed, “it
is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for
children.”27
Due process jurisprudence is no different. A quartet of cases
decided by the Supreme Court between the 1930s and the 1960s
recognized that fairness demanded special rules for children. The first
two cases involved interrogation by police. In Haley v. Ohio (1948),28
a plurality concluded that a statement obtained from a fifteen-year-old
interrogated by relays of police from midnight until he confessed
around 5:00 a.m. without a lawyer or an adult with him was
involuntary and coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.29 According to the Court, “a mere child—an
easy victim of the law— . . . cannot be judged by the more exacting

24. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273.
25. Children at common law, and in many cases still to this day, could void a legal contract at
their option. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 230 (2d ed. 1990) (“Common law courts early
announced the prevailing view that a minor’s contract is ‘voidable’ at the instance of the minor.”);
Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 47, 50–51 (2012).
26. See Kevin Lapp, Databasing Delinquency, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 202 (2015) (“Two
particular vulnerabilities of youth—their susceptibility to poor decisionmaking and their physical
and emotional immaturity—shape the legal regulation of juveniles.”).
27. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481 (2012).
28. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
29. Id. at 601. Until the mid-twentieth century, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause regulated police interrogation. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (declaring that
no person may be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law”). It required
that confessions be voluntary, prohibiting law enforcement from overbearing the will of a suspect
to get her to confess. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–24 (1959).
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standards of maturity.”30 That law enforcement advised the youth of
his rights was not sufficient for him to go it alone against government
agents.31 In Gallegos v. Colorado (1962),32 the Supreme Court
reiterated that a juvenile subject of police interrogation “cannot be
compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.”33 Juvenile
interrogation, the court explained, involves “a person who is not equal
to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of
the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know
how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights.”34 In the Court’s view, a juvenile suspect could
not, by himself, “know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as
he had.”35
A pair of cases from the 1960s brought due process protections
from the station house to the courthouse. In Kent v. United States
(1966),36 the Supreme Court recognized a due process right to
appointed counsel for juveniles at transfer hearings, where juvenile
court judges determine whether to transfer a delinquency case to adult
criminal court.37 The Court held that only the appointment of counsel
for the juvenile would ensure that the transfer hearing would be
fundamentally fair.38 In In re Gault (1967),39 the Supreme Court
expanded the due process right to appointed counsel to juvenile
respondents at the adjudication stage of civil delinquency proceedings
because “[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon

30. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599.
31. Id. at 601 (The Court could not “indulge [the] assumptions” that a fifteen-year-old, without
the aid of counsel, “would have a full appreciation of that advice and that . . . he had a freedom of
choice.”).
32. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
33. Id. at 54 (Gallegos was a fourteen-year-old held for five days without seeing a lawyer,
parent, or other friendly adult who, after being advised of his right to silence by police, confessed
to an assault.).
34. Id. (This conclusion applied “no matter how sophisticated” the juvenile.).
35. Id.
36. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37. Id at 564.
38. Id. at 561; see generally id. at 554 (The provision of counsel, the Court observed, was part
of “society’s special concern for children.”).
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a
defense and to prepare and submit it.”40
Notably, none of these cases involved amicus briefs from
psychologists, and none involved citations to scientific findings
regarding the distinguishing cognitive or psychosocial characteristics
of juveniles. Indeed, long before the brain development revolution of
the last couple of decades, judges and policymakers plainly
understood that the differences between children and adults demanded
special accommodations to ensure fairness. As the President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
observed fifty years ago, “[t]he most informal and well-intentioned of
judicial proceedings are technical; few adults without legal training
can influence or even understand them; certainly children cannot.”41
The last three decades have brought empirical backing to these
common sense conclusions and spurred a renewed effort to ensure that
the law provides children with special protections. The first major
ruling, Roper v. Simmons (2005),42 outlawed the death penalty for
juvenile offenders.43 The decision was grounded in “general
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults” that are “too
marked and well understood” to ignore.44 Yet, as Professor Terry
Maroney has observed, despite the emphasis on brain science in
argument and in filings, the Supreme Court dedicated “a grand total of
one phrase” to that science.45 According to the Court, its conclusions
about the distinguishing characteristics of juveniles reflect what “any
parent knows.”46 In Graham v. Florida (2010),47 which outlawed life
without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses committed by
juveniles, the citation to science grew to two sentences.48 The

40. Id. at 36.
41. U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86 (1967).
42. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
43. Id. at 551.
44. Id. at 569, 572.
45. Maroney, supra note 22, at 197.
46. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
47. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
48. Id. at 68 (noting that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds”); see Maroney, supra note 22, at 201.
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discussion expanded to a paragraph in Miller v. Alabama (2012),49 the
Court’s third juvenile sentencing case.50
That accommodations for youth within the law are grounded as
much in common sense and long-known, stable truths as new
scientific findings was brought home by the Supreme Court in its
recent case crafting special considerations for youth interrogated by
police. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011),51 the Court put it plainly:
a person’s age “generates commonsense conclusions about behavior
and perception” that “apply broadly to children as a class” and “are
self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself.”52 Individuals
“need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental
psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and
cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age.53 They simply need
the common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and
neither is an adult.”54 According to the Court, “to ignore the very real
differences between children and adults . . . would be to deny children
the full scope of the procedural safeguards” offered by the law.55 The
Court, in short, could discern no reason to blind itself to the
“commonsense reality” that juveniles are different from adults in ways
that matter to the law.56
The upshot of these cases is that developmental science is but
“one source of data tending to confirm a general proposition about
gross differences between adolescents and adults” relevant throughout
the law.57 Rather than a brain science revolution in the twenty-first
century regarding juveniles and the law, therefore, there is instead,
after a wayward period,58 a revived commitment to providing children
49. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
50. Id. at 471, 472 n.5 (observing that Roper and Graham “rested not only on common sense—
on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well” and acknowledging that
“[t]he evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the science and social science
supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger”).
51. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
52. Id. at 272.
53. Id. at 279–80.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 281 (referring to, in this context, the Miranda procedural safeguards of individuals
interrogated by police while in custody).
56. Id. at 265.
57. Id. at 273 (given a history “replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that children cannot
be viewed simply as miniature adults”); Maroney, supra note 22, at 201.
58. See Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD.
L. REV. 849, 851–82 (2010); Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes
from an Ideological Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
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with enhanced protections on account of “commonsense conclusions”
that “anyone who was a child” knows.59
Perhaps no such protection is more important than the right to
appointed legal counsel for juveniles involved in judicial proceedings.
Litigants in general (be they juveniles or adults) need the assistance of
counsel for many reasons. At the adjudication stage, counsel ensures
the procedural fairness of legal proceedings, helps litigants negotiate
pre-trial matters, safeguards litigants’ substantive rights, asserts
claims and defenses, presents and tests evidence, holds opposing
counsel to its burden of proof, advocates for fair resolutions and
discretionary relief, and preserves issues for appeal. The assistance of
a lawyer is especially important in complex legal proceedings that
involve intricate statutory schemes that demand familiarity and
understanding of state and federal case law to interpret and apply.
When those complex legal proceedings can result in detention, and
separation from family and community, appointing counsel becomes
imperative.
The characteristics of youth greatly heighten the need for
counsel.60 A substantial body of research has consistently
demonstrated that adolescents lack a basic understanding of court
proceedings and the cognitive capacities to represent themselves.61 In
brief, the research supports the following findings about adolescents:
• adolescents’ brain structures for planning and similar
tasks are still developing;
• adolescents’ undeveloped capability of regulating
impulses or emotions frustrates their ability to think
strategically about important decisions;
59. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272.
60. Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent
Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 323 (2006)
(recognizing that while there are exceptions, the general rule is that people under the majority age
are legally incompetent).
61. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents’ Judgment and
Culpability, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 325,
341–42 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence
Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1763, 1774–80 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in
Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 222–23 (1995); Jay N. Giedd, The Amazing Teen Brain,
SCI. AM., June 2015, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/risky-teen-behavior-is-drivenby-an-imbalance-in-brain-development/ (“MRI studies show that the teenage brain is not an old
child brain or a half-baked adult brain; it is a unique entity characterized by changeability . . . .
[T]he prefrontal cortex, which controls impulses, does not mature until the 20s.”).
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•

adolescents’ undeveloped planning ability makes them
less future-oriented, and less capable of properly
understanding the consequences of their decisions;
• adolescents are more likely than adults to yield to
authority figures rather than make their own decisions;
• adolescents’ decision-making deficiencies are magnified
in stressful situations; and
• parents do not make up for adolescents’ lack of cognitive
capacity.62
Some of these characteristics alone demonstrate that adolescents
lack the capacity to represent themselves in judicial proceedings.
Taken together, the list is irrefutable.
The state’s parens patriae obligation further underscores the need
to provide appointed counsel for child litigants. Originating in AngloAmerican common law centuries ago, the doctrine encompasses the
government’s power and responsibility to protect and care for those
who cannot take care of themselves, including children.63 Latin for
“parent of the country,” the parens patraie doctrine obligates the state
to serve as the ultimate protector of a child’s interests.64 This interest
favors appointed counsel for child litigants.65
Finally, the dependence that marks childhood makes appointed
counsel necessary. Simply put, most youth lack the financial resources
to secure counsel for themselves. This is especially true of youths who
come into contact with criminal justice and family court systems.66

62. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 89–116 (2013); ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING
JUVENILE JUSTICE 46–60 (2008).
63. Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century:
Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 382 (2000);
Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
64. See Clark, supra note 63, at 415 (“[T]he doctrine of parens patriae itself gives government
the power to act parentally towards children, beyond its police power over adult citizens and beyond
protecting them from its own or others’ coercion.”).
65. Good, supra note 15, at 141.
66. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225,
1237 (1999) (“[T]he risks associated with poverty make it more likely for poor children and their
families to end up in the juvenile court system.”); Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The
Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 331, 346–47 (2002) (“[T]he overwhelming
majority of child protective proceedings involve the poor . . . .”).
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B. Categorical
In due process cases, the law typically takes a categorical
approach. The governing test for determining whether a proceeding
comported with due process is the Mathews v. Eldridge test, which
balances (1) the private interest at stake in the proceedings; (2) the risk
of erroneous deprivation of such interest under current procedures and
the likelihood that additional or substitute procedural safeguards
would reduce that risk; and (3) the government’s interest, including
the fiscal and administrative burdens that a proposed procedural
safeguard would impose.67 Predominantly, the Supreme Court has
applied the Mathews balancing test categorically. As the Court has put
it repeatedly, “a process must be judged by the generality of cases to
which it applies, not the rare exceptions.”68 This means that courts do
not focus on any particular litigant or case, but analyze the interests at
stake for claimants like the plaintiff, and consider the costs and the
benefits of the additional procedure across the general category of
proceedings.69
Due process claims by juveniles have been analyzed as
categorical claims and resolved with categorical rules, even outside
the Mathews framework. The foundational juvenile due process cases
of Kent and Gault, for example, found that due process required
counsel for juveniles, not because the individual characteristics of
Morris Kent or Gerald Gault made counsel necessary in their
particular cases, but because juveniles as a class need counsel for their
proceedings to be fundamentally fair.70 Similarly, the Supreme
Court’s recent sentencing cases have resulted in bright-line
prohibitions on the death penalty and automatic life without parole
67. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
68. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321, 330 (1985); see
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (“[Procedural] rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the
truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) (same); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612–13 (1979) (same);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 n.49 (1977) (same).
69. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341–44, 348 (considering what is “typically” or “generally” true
of claimants and whether additional procedures would “often” or “in most cases” reduce the risk
of error); John Pollock, The Case Against Case-by-Case: Identifying Categorical Rights to Counsel
in Basic Human Needs Cases, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 813 (2013). But see Turner v. Rogers, 564
U.S. 431 (2011) (rejecting a due process claim to appointed counsel in all civil contempt cases and
holding that, on a case-by-case basis, individuals may require counsel to ensure that their
proceeding was fundamentally fair). Notably, Turner did not address proceedings where the
government “is likely to have counsel or some competent representative.” Id. at 449.
70. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966).
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sentences for juvenile offenders.71 Likewise, when insisting on special
protections for youth subject to police interrogation, the Court
observed that legal protections for juveniles “as a class” reflect “the
settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth
are universal.”72
There is no reason to depart from this categorical approach with
regard to a right to counsel for child litigants. While the categorical
method comes with occasional under- or over-inclusiveness,73 the
reason that fairness demands counsel for child litigants—the
distinguishing characteristics of youth as a class—will always be
present. Further, a categorical approach optimizes fairness, and it is
much more efficient to treat members of a large similar group in a like
manner.
A categorical approach for due process claims to counsel by child
litigants is also preferred because of the shortcomings of the Mathews
balancing approach.74 Specifically with respect to child litigants, the
Mathews balancing approach does not sufficiently allow for
consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of child litigants and
the long-held commitment within the law to special rules for youth.
For example, Mathews factor one is the private interest at stake.75
While children are autonomous individuals with liberty interests of
their own, this factor is easily clouded by children’s status as
dependents of adults who possess strong rights to control them.76 As
71. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
72. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2011). More often than not, this results in
lines drawn at age 18, though that is not always the case. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 574 (2005) (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
between childhood and adulthood.”); Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1116
(2012) (“[B]enchmarks of maturity in the law frequently occur at different points in time.”).
73. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the
objections always raised against categorical rules.”).
74. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 103–05
(1985) (arguing that Mathews transformed due process inquiries into utilitarian ones that
subordinated the intrinsic value of the process as a fundamental, individual right); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988) (“[The Mathews court’s] approach
overlooks the unquantifiable human interest in receiving decent treatment . . . [and] provides the
Court a facile means to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the relative weights to be
accorded each of the three factors.”); Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 1059, 1105 (2012) (“One of the many shortcomings of the Mathews balancing test is that
it privileges error costs over other costs as the relevant deprivation.”).
75. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
76. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1036–50 (1992).
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the Supreme Court put it in a case regarding pretrial detention, a
juvenile’s liberty interest “must be qualified” because “juveniles,
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”77 The status of
children, therefore, and the frequent presence of adults alongside child
litigants, makes it easy for courts to undervalue the private interests at
stake.
The state’s parens patriae obligation further muddies the
Mathews analysis when due process claims are brought by children.
Because the child’s interest in his own welfare and the state’s interest
in the child’s welfare overlap, the parens patriae obligation might be
thought to double the weight of the child’s best interest in the Mathews
due process balancing.78 Often, courts consider the parens patriae
interest as promoted by procedures that enhance the accuracy of
proceedings.79 Sometimes, however, courts have considered the
parens patriae interest as weighing against additional procedures
because the government interest in protecting the welfare of the child
was thought vindicated by a speedy resolution of the proceedings.80 In
Gault, the Supreme Court held that the parens patriae nature of
delinquency proceedings was not sufficient to protect an
unrepresented child litigant’s interests.81 All of which is to say that
courts struggled to consistently factor the parens patriae obligation
into the Mathews balancing inquiry.

77. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (A juvenile’s “interest in freedom from
institutional restraints . . . is undoubtedly substantial . . . But that interest must be qualified by the
recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”).
78. See Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (Vance, J., dissenting) (“The interest
of the state as parens patriae is identical to the interest of the child.”); In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d
524, 555 (Mich. 2014); Good, supra note 15, at 141 (noting that the parens patriae interest therefore
weighs on the private-interest side of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing scale, and favors counsel
for child litigants). As Benjamin Good has observed, the parens patriae interest as part of a
Mathews balancing “is something of a paradox—though it belongs to the government, it is
vindicated by the procedural safeguards sought by [children]” in due process litigation. Good, supra
note 15, at 141.
79. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
80. In re Alexander V., 613 A.2d 780, 785 (Conn. 1992) (“We must, therefore, consider the
state’s interest, as parens patriae, in minimizing the delay that a competency hearing would
occasion in promptly determining the child’s uncertain future.”); see also GPH v. Giles, 578 N.E.2d
729, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“The state, in exercising its parens patriae role and for the finite
period specified in the emergency detention statute, may limit an alleged mental patient’s
constitutional right to counsel.”).
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1976) (finding that neither the probation officer nor the
juvenile court judge could sufficiently protect the juvenile litigants’ interests and that due process
demanded counsel for juveniles).
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To be consistent with due process jurisprudence generally, to
avoid the blind spots of a Mathews balancing, and because the
characteristics of youth that make counsel necessary are always
present for child litigants, the right to appointed counsel for child
litigants should be a categorical one.
C. “Significant Interest”
The due process clauses protect against deprivations of liberty
and property.82 Physical liberty is a significant, but not the only, liberty
interest protected by due process.83 Courts have also found that the
right to family integrity is a significant interest held by children
protected by due process.84 Because of the broad scope of the interests
protected by due process, judicial proceedings involving a child
litigant that do not deal with a significant liberty or property interest
are rare.
PART II: THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR CHILD LITIGANTS:
CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE85
This Part explores the current legal landscape of a child litigant’s
right to appointed counsel. It shows a broad national consensus that
fairness demands appointed counsel for juveniles in civil proceedings
when significant rights or liberty are at stake.86
82. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. (“[N]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit [protected by the due process clause], a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”).
83. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (noting that the “liberty” protected
by the due process clause “includes more than the absence of physical restraint”); Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“[F]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”).
84. See Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Supreme Court cases)
(“Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without
governmental interference.”); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir.
2000) (“[A] child’s right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent.”)
85. The bulk of the content of this Part was compiled by the author for an amicus curiae brief
submitted to the Ninth Circuit in the case of C.J.L.G. Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Kevin Lapp,
et al. in Support of Reversal, C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, No. 16-73801 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018).
86. Many jurisdictions have not yet fulfilled the mandates of appointed counsel for juveniles,
and many juveniles proceed pro se because courts permit them to waive appointed counsel. See
Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
175 (2007); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A
Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. no. 3, 2008, Art. 5 (2008).
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A. Criminal and Delinquency Proceedings
Since the United States Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama
(1932)87 that “the failure of the trial court to make an effective
appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due process” in a capital
case,88 the right to counsel at government expense in legal proceedings
has spread widely. The right was expanded to all federal criminal
defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst (1938).89 In Gideon v. Wainwright
(1963),90 the Supreme Court held that due process demanded that all
criminal defendants facing felony charges in federal or state court be
provided with counsel.91
Shortly after Gideon, the Court held that due process demands
appointed counsel for juvenile respondents at the adjudication stage of
civil delinquency proceedings because of two factors: (1) juveniles are
ill-equipped to perform the tasks necessary to defend themselves; and
(2) the stakes were too high in delinquency proceedings to permit
juveniles to defend themselves in court without a lawyer.92 In
delinquency proceedings, the government accuses a juvenile of

87. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
88. Id. at 69 (“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”).
89. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). Despite the categorical approach in federal
criminal cases, the Supreme Court initially limited the right to appointed counsel outside of federal
criminal cases to the special circumstances of a particular case. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466
(1942). Under this approach, the Supreme Court recognized that youth was a special circumstance
that favored the appointment of counsel to young criminal defendants. For example, in Wade v.
Mayo, the Supreme Court held under the special circumstances test that an eighteen-year-old
defendant’s youth made him incapable of adequately representing himself. 334 U.S. 672, 684
(1948) (“There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity are
incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature. This
incapacity is purely personal and can be determined only by an examination and observation of the
individual. Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint counsel is a denial of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Notably, Defendant Wade was 18 years old
and had prior convictions and thus was “no a stranger to the Court Room.” Id. at 683. Similarly,
the Supreme Court held that a seventeen-year-old should have been provided counsel before
pleading guilty to burglary. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 442 (1948) (“Petitioner was
young and inexperienced in the intricacies of criminal procedure when he pleaded guilty to crimes
which carried a maximum sentence of eighty years.”).
90. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
91. Id. at 345 (limited only by the defendant’s financial ability to retain his own counsel).
92. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1967).
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conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult.93 While
juvenile courts aim for more rehabilitative dispositions for juveniles
than the punitive focus of criminal courts, the consequences of
delinquency proceedings can include fines, probation, and prolonged
detention.94 As the Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he juvenile needs
the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and
to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”95
Notably, the Supreme Court held that due process demanded counsel
for juveniles in delinquency proceedings, even though Gerald Gault
and other juveniles at the time did not face a prosecutor in their
proceedings.96 The due process right to appointed counsel in
delinquency proceedings is a categorical one, and does not depend on
the developmental characteristics of the juvenile before the court
(subject only, in some states, to a juvenile’s ability to pay).97
The right to appointed counsel for juveniles applies at transfer
hearings as well, where juvenile court judges determine whether to
transfer a delinquency case to adult criminal court.98 Even though a
transfer hearing does not, by itself, result in any penalties, the Supreme
Court recognized that the decision to transfer a juvenile’s case from
juvenile court to criminal court was “critically important,” and
93. Delinquency proceedings do not, however, result in criminal convictions. See, e.g., CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 2019) (“An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile
court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the
juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.”).
94. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731 (West 2019) (detailing dispositional
alternatives for those adjudicated delinquents, including physical confinement equal to the
maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult for the same offense).
95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (“[T]he
child requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him.”).
96. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors: Elected and Agency
Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and Child Protection Cases, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 743, 761 (2018) (“From family courts’ origin at the turn of the twentieth century
to the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Gault, family courts had developed a unique system for
making charging decisions in both child protection and juvenile delinquency cases, which placed
court staff in decisive roles and excluded prosecutors and other executive-branch officials.”). In
Gault’s case, he was questioned by the judge. Two probation officers were present, but no
prosecutor. Today, juvenile delinquency proceedings are presented by the state by trained
prosecutors. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 64 (3d ed.
2009) (“Entry-level attorneys in the juvenile unit should be as qualified as any entry-level attorney,
and receive special training regarding juvenile matters.”).
97. Some states require proof of indigence before they will provide a court-appointed lawyer
to a juvenile in delinquency proceedings, while others presume indigence. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-2000 (2013) (“All juveniles shall be conclusively presumed to be indigent . . . .”).
98. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
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therefore it was “equally of ‘critical importance’ that the material
submitted to the judge . . . be subjected . . . to examination, criticism,
and refutation.”99 The Court held that only counsel for the juvenile
would ensure that the transfer hearing was fundamentally fair.100
Appointed counsel for youth in legal proceedings involving “such
tremendous consequences,” the Court declared, is part of “society’s
special concern for children.”101 The due process right to appointed
counsel at transfer hearings is similarly is a categorical one, and does
not depend on the developmental characteristics of the juvenile before
the court.
To best protect juvenile litigants, numerous scholars and expert
bodies go beyond urging a right to counsel and endorse prohibitions
on waiver of counsel by juveniles.102 For instance, the Institute for
Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association Juvenile
Justice Standards prohibit waiver of counsel by juveniles,103 and both
the National Juvenile Defender Center and the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association similarly call for a ban on the waiver of counsel
by juveniles.104 These groups do so because effective assistance of
counsel for juveniles is the precursor to a juvenile’s ability to exercise
all other important rights during the course of the juvenile justice
process. Moreover, “[f]ew juveniles have the experience and
understanding to decide meaningfully that the assistance of counsel
would not be helpful.”105 A growing number of states have followed
99. Id. at 563.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 554.
102. See Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 609–622, 650 (2002) (advocating for the prohibition of juvenile
waiver of counsel based on juveniles’ lack of capacity and public policy, and rejecting concerns
regarding the violation of juveniles’ right to autonomy); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1345 (1989) (arguing for a mandatory representation model in
delinquency court).
103. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS:
STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION 14 (1980); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the
Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 418–20
(2008) (arguing that young suspects lack the capacity to waive counsel and be interrogated without
the presence of an adult).
104. AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFS. AND NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
PROVIDING QUALITY DELINQUENCY REPRESENTATION THROUGH INDIGENT DEFENSE DELIVERY
SYSTEMS 1, 2 (2005) (“The indigent defense delivery system should ensure that children do not
waive appointment of counsel.”).
105. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 103, at 14 (recommending a
prohibition on waiver of counsel at pretrial proceedings).
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these recommendations and restrict or prohibit juveniles from waiving
their right to counsel.106
The rest of this Part shows that in the decades since Kent and
Gault, courts and legislatures have extended the right to appointed
counsel far beyond the delinquency setting.
B. Status Offense Hearings
The bulk of states provide juveniles a right to appointed counsel
in status offense hearings.107 Status offenses are non-criminal, nondelinquent offenses that would not be offenses for an adult.108 They
include matters like curfew violations, truancy, alcohol or tobacco
possession, incorrigibility, and running away.109 Disposition can
include court-ordered services, probation, and out-of-home

106. These states include: Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-103 (2018) (minors may not waive
counsel in dependency proceeding)); Illinois (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / 5-170(b) (2018); 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-115.5 (1987) (“[A] minor may not waive the right to the assistance of
counsel in his or her defense [in delinquency proceedings].”)); Iowa (IOWA CODE § 232.11(2)
(2018) (minors may not waive counsel at detention, adjudicatory, waiver, or dispositional
hearings)); Kentucky (D.R. v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (juvenile
may not waive counsel unless counsel is first appointed and consulted with)); Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 3.915(B) (juvenile may not waive counsel if court determines that best interests of
juvenile or public require appointment)); New York (N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249(a) (McKinney
2018) (juvenile presumed unable to waive counsel in delinquency or person in need of supervision
proceeding; presumption can be rebutted only with clear and convincing evidence once attorney
has been appointed)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. JUV. CT. P. 152(A) (juveniles may not waive counsel
in detention, adjudicatory, transfer, dispositional or probation hearings)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 51.10(b) (2017) (prohibits juveniles from waiving counsel at any transfer, adjudicatory,
disposition, detention, or mental health commitment review hearing)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT.
§ 938.23(1m)(a) (2018) (minors under fifteen may not waive counsel)).
107. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATUS OFFENSE CASES (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/right_to_counsel
_factsheet.authcheckdam.pdf.
108. Literature Review, OJJDP (Sept. 2015), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews
/Status_Offenders.pdf.
109. Id. States use various terms to characterize status offenders: “Children in Need of
Services,” “Children in Need of Supervision,” “Children in Need of Assistance,” “Youth in Need
of Intervention,” “Family in Need of Services,” “incorrigible youth,” “unruly youth,” “wayward
youth” or simply “status offenses.” In some states, status offense petitions fall under the
delinquency jurisdiction, in others under the dependency jurisdiction. Status offense cases can
represent a significant percentage of a juvenile court’s caseload. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 31 (2015), https://oag.ca.gov/cjsc/pubs#juvenileJustice
(reporting over 11,000 status offense petitions filed in 2015, representing 16.6 percent of all
petitions filed in juvenile court in 2015).
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placement.110 Secure detention is strongly disfavored in status offense
proceedings, but does occur.111
Consistent with the theory advanced here, thirty-nine states and
the District of Columbia have laws requiring judges to appoint counsel
to juveniles in status offense proceedings either mandatorily or under
certain circumstances, such as when counsel is requested.112 Six
additional states allows judges to appoint counsel in status offense
proceedings at their discretion.113
110. See Sarah Hockenberry & Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Court Statistics 2013, 2015
NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. 81 (finding that the court ordered out-of-home placement in 8 percent
of all adjudicated status offense cases in 2013).
111. See 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11)(A) (2012). States holding status offenders in secure
detention risk losing a significant portion of their juvenile justice block grant awards. Status Offense
Issues, JJGPS, http://www.jjgps.org/status-offense-issues (last visited Jan 19, 2019). If it is alleged
that a status offender violated a valid court order, a violation hearing may be held. At that violation
hearing, secure detention may be imposed. 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11)(A)(i), 11133(a)(23). Federal
regulations require counsel at such violation hearings. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(f)(3)(v)(D) (2018)
(Status offenders who have allegedly violated a valid order of the court must be afforded “the right
to legal counsel, and the right to have such counsel appointed by the court if indigent” at the
violation hearing.).
112. Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws requiring judges to
appoint counsel to juveniles in status offense proceedings: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316
(2018)); California (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 634 (West 2018)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-3-203 (2018)); D.C. (D.C. CODE § 16-2304(a) (2018)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11402 (2018)); Idaho: (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-514 (2018)); Illinois (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5
(2018)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 31-32-4-2 (2018)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2205 (2018));
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.060 (West 2018)); Maryland (MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-20 (West 2018)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39F (2018));
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17c(2) (2018) (court shall appoint attorney unless child
waives right)); Mississippi (MISS. UNIF. R. YOUTH CT. P. 24 (2018)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-5-1413 (2017) (counsel mandatory in formal proceedings)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62D.030 (2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-D:12 (2018)); New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. § 32A-3B-8 (2019) (counsel mandatory if juvenile over age 14)); New York (N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 741 (McKinney 2018)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West 2018));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (2018)); Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6337 (2018)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-41-31 (2002)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36 (2018)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-7A-31 (2018) (court shall appoint
attorney if child can’t afford)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-6-1111 (2018)); Vermont (VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (2017)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.192(1)(C) (2018));
West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 49-4-708 (2017)). An additional eleven states provide a qualified
right to counsel for juveniles in status offense proceedings: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8221(A) (2018)); Connecticut (CONN. R. SUP. CT. JUV. § 30a-1(b)(2) (2019)); Iowa (IOWA CODE
§ 232.89 (2019)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3306 (2017)); Minnesota (MINN. R. JUV.
DELINQ. P. 3.02 (2018)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272 (2018)); New Jersey: (N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4A-39 (West 2018)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (2017)); Texas (TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10 (West 2017)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(C) (2018));
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-422(a) (2018)).
113. See Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (2018)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-87(a)
(2018)); Louisiana (LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 810 (2018)); Missouri (MO. SUP. CT. R. 115.02
(2018)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126 (2018)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT.
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C. Dependency Proceedings
Every state has provisions for appointing a lawyer to juveniles in
dependency proceedings.114 In dependency proceedings (also known
as child welfare, or abuse and neglect, proceedings), the state brings
allegations of abuse or neglect against parents or guardians.
Dependency proceedings do not result in any finding of wrongdoing
by the minor. Nevertheless, dependency proceedings can result in a
child’s temporary or permanent removal from her family to foster
homes and group residential institutions.115
Recognizing the importance of the juvenile’s interests in the
outcome of such proceedings, thirty states and the District of
Columbia mandate appointing a lawyer for juveniles in dependency
proceedings.116 Another fourteen have a qualified right, providing a
§ 938.23(1m)(a) (2018) (The court has discretion to appoint counsel in a “youth in need of
intervention” case but a child must be represented by counsel before she can be placed outside the
home.)).
114. Federal law has long required that all minors have, at least, a guardian ad litem (GAL) in
dependency proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2018). A GAL need not be an attorney,
and for many reasons is not the equivalent of an attorney. Id. A primary difference is that guardians
ad litem are typically expected to advocate for the minor’s best interests, as perceived by the GAL,
instead of being client-directed as in the typical attorney-client relationship. Id. While this
undoubtedly makes sense for infant clients, it is increasingly problematic as the age of the juvenile
respondent increases.
115. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200–01, 201 n.9 (1989)
(noting that placement in foster care can be substantially similar to “incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty”); see also Jennifer K. Pokempner
et al., The Legal Significance of Adolescent Development on the Right to Counsel: Establishing the
Constitutional Right to Counsel for Teens in Child Welfare Matters and Assuring a Meaningful
Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 537–38 (2012)
(explaining that a link exists between healthy child development and consistent, supportive
relationships, which is disrupted by dependency proceedings, where “[r]emoval from an
adolescent’s family, friends, and community is at stake”).
116. Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 12-15-102(10), 12-15-304(a), 26-14-11 (2018)); Arkansas
(ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-316(f), 9-27-401 (2018)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1103(59), 19-3-203(1) (2018)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-129(c)(2), 46b-136, 51-296
(2018)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2504(f) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A
(2018)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304(b)(5) (West 2018)); Georgia (GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-103 (2018)); Iowa (IOWA CODE §§ 232.89(2), 232B.5(16) (2019)); Kansas (KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-2205 (2018)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.060, 620.100(1)(a) (West
2018)); Louisiana (LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 607 (2018)); Maryland (MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-813 (2017)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 § 39F (2012)); Michigan
(MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 712A.17c(7), 722.630 (2017); MICH. CT. R. 3.915(B) (2019)); Mississippi
(MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201, (2009); MISS. UNIF. R. YOUTH CT. PRAC. 13(a) (2018)); Missouri
(MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.160, 211.211 (West 2018)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272
(2018)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.420 (2013)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.21,
9:6-8.23, 30:4C-15.4, 30:4C-85(a)(2) (West 2018)); New York (N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(7)
(McKinney 2018); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 241, 249(a), 1120(b) (McKinney 2018)); North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601 (2018)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 10a, § 1-4-306 (West 2018));
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lawyer under certain conditions, such as when parental rights have
been terminated117 or when the juvenile is over a certain age.118 The
remaining six states permit, but do not require, appointed counsel for
minors in dependency proceedings.119
In those minority of jurisdictions where appointing a lawyer is not
mandatory, courts often ensure that minors are represented by
appointed counsel. For example, California law provides that, in
dependency proceedings, “the court shall appoint counsel for the child
or nonminor dependent, unless the court finds that the child or
nonminor dependent would not benefit from the appointment of
counsel.”120 Despite the discretionary nature of the right to appointed
counsel, dependency courts rarely, if ever, invoke this provision to
deny appointed counsel to a child of any age.121
Because every state has statutory provisions regarding the
appointment of counsel for children in dependency proceedings, the
Supreme Court has never had occasion to decide whether due process
requires the appointment of counsel to children in dependency
proceedings. A number of state and federal courts, however, have held
that minors have a right to counsel under the due process clause of a
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.195 (West 2003) (counsel must be appointed upon request));
Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2018), PA. R. JUV. CT. P. 1151 (2019)); South Dakota
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-7A-31, 26-8A-18 (2018)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1126, 37-1-149 (2018)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-6-317, 78A-6-1111, 78A-6-902(2) (West
2018)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (2017); VT. R. FAM. P. 6(b) (2018)); Virginia
(VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(A) (2010)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4-601(a), 2921-2 (2018)); Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-211 (2018)).
117. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (West 2018)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 39.01305
(2018); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217)); Illinois (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / 1-5(1) (2007)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(b) (2018); S. 1386, 90th Leg., 2017–2018 (Mn. 2017)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-425, 47-1-104(4) (2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-C:10 (2018)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-26, 27-20-48.4(4) (2017)); Ohio
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West 2018); (OHIO JUV. R. 4(A), (C)(1)); Rhode Island (R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 40.1-5-8(d)(2), 40-11-7.1(b)(3) (2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.2-3(4) (2018); R.I.
R. JUV. P. §§ 15(c)(3), 18(c)(3)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.012 (West 2017));
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100 (2017)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 48.23(1m) (2019)).
118. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1614(2) (2009) (providing a right to appointed counsel for those 12
and older in dependency proceedings); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10(C) (1978) (providing a right
to appointed counsel for those 14 and older in dependency proceedings); KING CTY. L. JU. C.R. 2.4
(providing a right to appointed counsel for those 12 and older in dependency proceedings).
119. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.050, 47.10.010 (2018); ALASKA CHILD IN NEED OF AID
R. 12(b)(3)); California (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c) (West 2018)); Hawaii (HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 587A-17(a) (2018)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 31-32-4-2(b) (2018)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1) (2010); ME. R. GUARDIANS AD LITEM 2); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-7-1620 (2018)).
120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c)(1).
121. The author’s research turned up no instances.
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state’s constitution in dependency proceedings. For example, a
Georgia court found a due process right to counsel in dependency
proceedings because of the fundamental liberty interests at stake and
the state’s parens patriae interest in protecting children could only be
adequately ensured if the child is represented by counsel throughout
the proceedings.122 Similarly, an Alabama court found a statute that
did not provide for the appointment of independent counsel to
represent a child in a neglect proceeding violated due process.123 A
New Jersey court concluded that the due process clause of the federal
and New Jersey Constitutions include a right to appointed counsel for
minors in dependency proceedings “to protect the interests of a minor
incapable of speaking for himself.”124
In civil delinquency, status offense, and child welfare
proceedings, courts and legislatures have agreed that, given the stakes
of those proceedings, the developmental characteristics of youth, and
the state’s parens patriae obligation to secure a child’s best interests,
fairness demands that child litigants be provided with counsel in those
proceedings.
D. Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings to terminate parental rights can “sever completely
and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child.”125 While
the proceeding primarily concerns the right held by the parent, the
interests of the minor in termination proceedings are likewise
fundamental. Not only can the proceedings terminate the legal
connection between a parent and child, they often effectively end the
parent-child relationship.126 Because of the significant interests at
stake, courts across the country have acknowledged that minors whose
parents face termination of their parental rights “are entitled to and
122. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356–62 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
123. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976); see also In re Jamie TT, 599
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894–95 (App. Div. 1993) (“[T]he Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions . . . mandate that there be some form of legal representation of [a child’s] interests in
the proceedings on the [abuse] petition [brought against the parent].”).
124. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Wandell, 382 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1978); In re Dependency of J.A., No. 45134-4-II, 2014 WL 2601713 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 10, 2014) (holding that due process demanded an attorney for the child because a non-attorney
representative could not adequately protect the legal interests of the child).
125. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
126. See Curnow ex rel. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing that “a child’s interest in her relationship with a parent is sufficiently weighty by itself
to constitute a cognizable liberty interest”).
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need the assistance of counsel.”127 As the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court put it, “[t]he decision whether to terminate is of
enormous consequence to the child. The child cannot have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in a contested proceeding without
the assistance of counsel, regardless whether the case is initiated by
the department or other agency or by a private party.128
The majority of states require appointed counsel for the minor in
TPR proceedings,129 and another sixteen have a qualified right to
appointed counsel.130

127. In re Christina M., 877 A.2d 941, 950 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); see also In re
Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 640 A.2d 1085, 1095 (Md. 1994) (finding the need for
counsel in termination proceedings to represent the interest of the juvenile “compelling”).
128. In re Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Mass. 2012) (also acknowledging children’s right
to appointed counsel “in a variety of circumstances where the parent-child relationship is at stake”).
129. Mandatory right to appointed counsel in privately and state-initiated adoption proceedings:
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-121(a)(1), 46b-129a(2)(A), 46b-136 (2019)); Louisiana
(LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1016, 1244.1(B) (2018)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 29 (2011); In re Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110 (Mass. 2012)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.025
(2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.211 (West 2018); MO. R. 30 CIR R. 22.1). Mandatory right to
appointed counsel in state-initiated termination of parental rights proceedings: Alabama (ALA.
CODE § 12-15-304(a) (West 2018)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-602 (LexisNexis 2018));
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2504(f) (2018)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-262
(2018)); Iowa (IOWA CODE § 232.113 (2019)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2205 (West 2018));
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-307(b) (West 2018)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 712A.17c(7) (2017), MICH. CT. R. 3.915(B)(2)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201(1)
(2004)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272(2)-3 (2016)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4C-15.4 (West 2018)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10(C) (2005) (minors aged
14 or older)); New York (N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 741 (McKinney 2018); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(7)
(McKinney 2018)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601 (2018)); Pennsylvania (23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2313(a) (2018)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-18 (2018));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-149 (2012)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.012 (West
2017)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(A) (2010)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2921-2 (West 2018)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1111 (West 2018)). Mandatory right to
appointed counsel in privately initiated adoption proceedings: Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,
§ 3-201 (2018)).
130. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221(A) (2018)); California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 7861
(West 2018)); Florida (FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217 (mandatory in certain cases pursuant to H.R. 561,
2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014))); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 16-1614 (2009)); Illinois (705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405 / 1-5 (2007)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(b) (2018)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-425 (2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:10
(2018)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (2017)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A,
§ 2-2-301(D) (2018)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2560 (A)–(B) (2008)); Vermont
(VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (2017)); Washington (WASH. RULE JUV. CT. R. 9.2(c)(1));
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 48.23(1m) (2019)); Ohio (In re Williams, 805 N.E.2d 1110, 1111, 1113
(Ohio 2004)); Oregon (In re D., 547 P.2d 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)).
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E. Judicial Bypass Hearings
Another civil proceeding in which juvenile litigants have a right
to appointed counsel is a non-adversarial judicial bypass hearing.
Judicial bypass hearings must be available if a state requires a minor
to notify or obtain consent from one or both parents before she can
receive an abortion.131 These proceedings are not adversarial, do not
result in any finding of wrongdoing by the minor, and there is no
possibility of detention or similar punishment. Nevertheless, of those
states that provide judicial bypass procedures for minors seeking an
abortion, all enable the appointment of counsel to the minor.
In over three quarters of the states that provide judicial bypass
hearings (thirty out of thirty-seven), juveniles have a statutory right to
appointed counsel in such hearings.132 Courts recognize that the right
to counsel is essential to protect the pregnant juvenile’s right to receive
an abortion.133 Four states have a qualified right to appointed counsel
131. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (introducing the requirement of bypass hearings).
132. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(b) (West 2018)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.030(d)
(2018)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(D) (2018)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 2016-809(1)(B) (2018)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(a) (2018)); Georgia: (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-11-684(a) (2018)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-609A(3) (2004)); Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 70 / 25(b) (West 2009)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(e) (2017)); Iowa (IOWA CODE
§ 135L.3(3)(b) (2018); IOWA CT. R. 8.24); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(b) (2014));
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(c) (West 2018)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 12S (2019)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.904(2)(e) (2018); MICH. CT. R.
3.615(F)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(2) (West 2018)); Missouri (MO. REV. STAT.
§ 188.028(2)(1) (2018)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-509 (2017)); Nebraska (NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 71-6903(7) (West 2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:34(II)(a)
(2018)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8(c) (2011)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.85(B)(2) (West 2018)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(B) (2018));
Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(e) (1992)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 4441-32(3) (2018)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7.1 (2019)); Tennessee (TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(c)(1) (2018)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(e) (West 2017));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(W) (West 2018)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4(d)
(2017)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 48.23(1m)(cm) (2018)). Maine no longer requires parental
consent prior to seeking an abortion. A statutory procedure remains in place for a minor to seek
judicial approval for the abortion, and that procedure contains a right to counsel for the
minor. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A(6)(A) (2018). Judicial bypass proceedings are
not required in states that do not require parental consent.
133. Planned Parenthood v. LaWall, 189 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (D. Ariz. 2001) (“[T]he minor’s
right to establish maturity is sufficiently protected by her statutory right to counsel.”); In re
Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 904 (Ala. 1988) (“[T]he minor’s conditional right to exercise her
constitutional choice of an abortion is further protected by her right of legal counsel.”); In re T.W.,
551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989) (“In [parental consent hearings] wherein a minor can be wholly
deprived of authority to exercise her fundamental right to privacy [by obtaining an abortion],
counsel is required under our state constitution.”); In re Moe, 523 N.E.2d 794, 795 (Mass. App. Ct.
1988) (“Counsel for the applicant, with foreknowledge of the case, may be able to draw out salient
information which the judge’s questioning will miss.”).
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in judicial bypass hearings.134 As a result, in over ninety percent of
judicial bypass states, the minor has a right to appointed counsel by
default, by asking for one, or by petitioning for a hearing before the
court. In the remaining three states that have judicial bypass hearings,
the right to appointed counsel is discretionary.135
F. Other
In a variety of other contexts, child litigants have a right to
counsel. Sometimes, it is because they are in a proceeding in which all
litigants are entitled to counsel, such as mental health commitment
proceedings.136 In other proceedings, such as civil protection order
proceedings that may lead to criminal violations, courts found that the
characteristics of youth supported a due process right to appointed
counsel.137 At other times, legislatures have granted child litigants a
right to appointed counsel to protect the child’s interest in family
relationships.138
G. No Right to Counsel
There are at least two types of proceedings in which child litigants
do not have a right to appointed counsel: student discipline hearings
and immigration removal proceedings.

134. Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1784(e) (2011)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
§ 144.343, subd. 6 (2004)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-509 (2017) (counsel assigned
upon request)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255 (2017) (minor has a right to appointed counsel
if the judge initially denies the minor’s request following an interview, and the minor files a petition
with the court requesting a formal hearing)).
135. Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-37.5-107(2)(b) (2010)); Utah (UTAH R. JUV. P. 60(c));
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(b)(iii) (2018)).
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-529(B) (2018) (requiring appointment of counsel for all
persons facing civil commitment for a mental disorder); In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1296 (Cal.
1977) (applying Gault to hold that children are entitled to counsel in civil commitment
proceedings); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221(C) (West 2018) (providing a right to
appointed counsel to juveniles in “any court appearance which may result in institutionalization or
mental health hospitalization”).
137. In re D.L., 937 N.E.2d 1042, 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (stating that the juvenile’s “young
age alone would indicate that he should have been appointed counsel” in civil protection order
proceedings that may lead to criminal violations).
138. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.425(b) (2011) (right to counsel for children involved in divorce
proceedings upon request); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 594(b) (2018) (mandating courts to appoint
counsel for a minor child when the child is called as a witness in a divorce or annulment
proceeding).
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1. Student Discipline Hearings
Courts and legislatures have recognized the tremendous
importance of education in a child’s development.139 Consistent with
this, courts have recognized that a child’s “legitimate entitlement to a
public education . . . [is] a property interest protected by the Due
Process clause.”140 Therefore, when school officials move to exclude
a juvenile from the classroom, for either a short-term suspension or an
expulsion, the juvenile has a right to some process. The Supreme
Court set the procedural floor for school suspensions quite low when
it held that due process only required an informal hearing in which the
child has the opportunity to “present his side of the story.”141 The
Court held that due process does not require a right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, or a right on behalf of the student to call his
own witnesses to verify his version of the incident, much less that the
government provide the child with a lawyer at the suspension
hearing.142 According to the Court, such rights risked overwhelming
administrative resources, and the Court worried that “escalating
[suspension hearings’] formality and adversary nature may not only
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its
effectiveness as part of the teaching process.”143
The Court did concede that suspensions lasting longer than ten
days “may require more formal procedures” to satisfy due process.144
And in many jurisdictions across the country, authorities have
imposed procedural requirements above and beyond the minimal floor

139. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (“[T]he total exclusion from the educational
process for more than a trivial period . . . is a serious event in the life of the suspended child.”);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.”). Education is not, however, considered a fundamental
right under the U.S. Constitution. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35
(1973). Some states have decreed that education is a fundamental right in their state constitution,
or state courts have interpreted education under the state constitution to be a fundamental right.
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; Sch. Dist.
of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995) (“[P]ublic education in
Pennsylvania is a fundamental right.”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W. 2d 186, 212
(Ky. 1989) (“A child’s right to an adequate education is a fundamental one under our
Constitution.”).
140. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
141. Id. at 581.
142. Indeed, the Supreme Court did not even require that states afford the child the opportunity
to secure counsel. Id. at 583.
143. Id. at 583.
144. Id. at 584.

(9) 52.4_LAPP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

A CHILD LITIGANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1/6/2020 4:41 PM

491

set in Goss v. Lopez (1975).145 None, however, afford a juvenile facing
exclusion from school a right to appointed counsel.146
To the extent that expulsions and short-term suspensions do not
involve a complete denial of access to public education, however, it is
arguably consistent with the theory advanced here. When students are
expelled from a school, they typically retain their right to a public
education, and are provided an alternative school placement.147 When
students are suspended from school, they may not attend school on
site, but still may receive work from the school so that they do not fall
behind during the suspension.148 What is lost as a result of an
expulsion or suspension is the ability to receive education at a
particular school, not the right to a public education. Nevertheless, the
lack of a right to counsel in school suspension and expulsion hearings
is, at the very least, troubling, and given the stakes and limited abilities
of youth to assert their rights and interests, arguably violates due
process.149
2. Immigration Proceedings
Tens of thousands of minors appear as respondents in
immigration removal proceedings annually. According to the
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), the number of
juveniles in immigration court removal proceedings had been
approximately 60,000 annually for the last few years.150 In Fiscal Year
(FY) 2018, the number reached the highest ever recorded. As of
November 2018, the United States had brought removal proceedings

145. 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Waterstone, supra note 15, at 487 (“[M]ost states have enacted
hearing procedures for long-term school exclusions that allow students an opportunity to introduce
evidence, confront witnesses, and make statements on their own behalf.”).
146. Id. at 488.
147. This is not always true. Id. at 492 (identifying New Mexico, North Carolina, and
Wisconsin as states where students are not necessarily offered an alternative educational placement
during an expulsion or suspension).
148. At least, this is the way it is supposed to happen. Often, suspended students do not receive
assignments during their suspension.
149. Waterstone, supra note 15, at 477.
150. Juveniles — Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, supra note 3.
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against over 247,000 juveniles in FY 2018.151 Some are as young as
two years old.152
In immigration removal proceedings, Congress has declared that
respondents have “the privilege of being represented, at no expense to
the Government, by counsel of the [respondent’s] choosing.”153 There
is no carve-out from this rule for child respondents. For FY 2018, twothirds of juvenile respondents in removal proceedings were not
represented.154
While some state and local jurisdictions with large immigrant
populations, including the states of New York and California, and
cities such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., New
York City, Baltimore, and Austin, have taken steps designed to ensure
that non-citizens are provided legal representation in removal
proceedings,155 courts have yet to recognize that due process demands
appointed counsel for every child litigant. Indeed, over the years,
courts have rejected both Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims to
appointed counsel in removal proceedings.156 And while several
151. Id. For FY 2018, case counts in TRAC’s Immigration Court “juvenile cases” include all
juveniles. Unlike prior years, they do not distinguish between children who arrive unaccompanied
and those who arrive as part of a family unit. Distinguishing Unaccompanied Children from
Children in Family Units, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 8, 2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/juvenile/note.html.
152. See Vivian Yee & Miriam Jordan, Migrant Children in Search of Justice: A 2-Year-Old’s
Day
in
Immigration
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/migrant-children-family-separation-court.html.
153. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012).
154. Juveniles — Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, supra note 3 (of 228,874
juveniles, 153,079 were not represented). From 2014 to 2016, approximately two-thirds of juvenile
respondents in immigration proceedings were represented by a lawyer. Id. (63 percent represented
in FY 2014, 66 percent represented in FY 2015 and FY 2016). But as the number of juveniles in
removal proceedings has grown, so too has the number and percentage of those who do not obtain
counsel. The figure for FY 2017 was 57 percent unrepresented (35,197 of 61,917). Prior to the
recent spike in the number of removal proceedings brought against juveniles, more juveniles than
not managed to secure some form of representation.
155. See New York State Becomes First in the Nation to Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants
Detained and Facing Deportation, VERA INST. JUST. (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-first-in-the-nation-toprovide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation; see also Jennifer M. Chacón,
Privatized Immigration Enforcement, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (noting that “some
states and localities with large numbers of noncitizen residents have begun to provide funding for
immigrant representation”).
156. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038
(1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel to criminal defendants does not
apply to respondents in civil removal proceedings); Al-Saka v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 427, 434 (6th
Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not guarantee a right to government-provided counsel
in [removal proceedings].”); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is
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federal courts of appeals have observed that, in particular cases, due
process may demand a right to counsel in removal proceedings,157 no
court has found that due process required counsel at government
expense in the case before the court.
Several recent decisions have addressed a minor respondent’s
procedural rights in removal proceedings, including a right to
appointed counsel. The Ninth Circuit held in Flores-Chavez v.
Ashcroft (2004)158 that children cannot accept service of a charging
document because “minors generally cannot appreciate or navigate the
rules of or rights surrounding final proceedings that significantly
impact their liberty interests.”159 Relatedly, in Jie Lin v. Ashcroft
(2004),160 the Ninth Circuit found a due process violation when an
asylum hearing was conducted despite minor’s counsel’s insufficient
preparation for the hearing.161 The case involved a fourteen-year-old
who “could not speak English, and had no knowledge of the American
legal system.”162 He had retained counsel, but counsel did little in the
way of preparation or advocacy during the hearing.163 Indeed, the
representation was so deficient that the court stated that proceeding
under the circumstances “flirted with denial of counsel altogether.”164
The court noted that “minors are entitled to trained legal assistance so
their rights may be fully protected.”165 Because it was a “near-certain
prospect” that the minor respondent was “unable to present his case
fully and fairly if unrepresented,”166 the Ninth Circuit found that the

no constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel in a removal
proceeding.”).
157. See Michelson v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990)
(noting that a due process claim to appointed counsel could be shown where sufficient prejudice
from the lack of counsel was shown); United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that a respondent in removal proceedings “has a right to counsel if the absence
of counsel would violate due process under the fifth amendment”).
158. 362 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2004).
159. Id. at 1160.
160. 377 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2004).
161. Id. at 1024–27.
162. Id. at 1019.
163. The Ninth Circuit found that the minor’s counsel had limited, if any, contact with her
client, unreasonably failed to investigate and present the factual and legal basis of the minor’s
asylum claim, failed to appear in court for the asylum hearing, conducted little advocacy via her
telephonic appearance, and failed to pursue a direct appeal to rectify the errors made at the hearing.
Id. at 1024–26.
164. Id. at 1033.
165. Id. (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997)).
166. Id.
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decision to proceed while the minor was effectively unrepresented
violated due process.167
These cases provide strong support for a due process right to
appointed counsel for child litigants. Although Flores-Chavez is not
about counsel, one doubts how children who lack the competence to
accept service in immigration cases may simultaneously be able to
represent themselves in immigration court against trained prosecutors.
And Jie-Lin declared that “minors are entitled to trained legal
assistance so their rights may be fully protected,”168 and found the
effective denial of counsel to amount to a violation of due process.169

167. Id. at 1033–34 (“[T]he IJ could not let [the minor’s] hearing proceed without counsel.”);
see also Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder (Franco-Gonzalez II), No. 10-cv-02211-DMG-DTB, 2013 WL
3674492 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2013) (holding that non-citizens who are not competent to represent
themselves by reason of a serious mental disorder or defect and who are detained during their
removal proceedings are entitled to the appointment of a qualified representative). The court held
that those respondents are not able to meaningfully exercise their rights under the Immigration and
Nationality Act to “examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.” Franco-Gonzalez II, 2013
WL 3674492 at *4. The court located the right not in the Due Process clause, but instead in section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination against those with disabilities. Id. at
*3; 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2017). Hewing to the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions when it is
unnecessary to reach them, the court did not reach the plaintiffs’ claim for a right to appointed
counsel under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Franco-Gonzalez II, 2013
WL 3674492 at *9. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
requires than an individual with disabilities be provided with meaningful access to the benefit
offered by the government. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985). The court found that
plaintiffs were “unable to meaningfully access the benefit offered—in this case, full participation
in their removal and detention proceedings—because of their disability.” Franco-Gonzalez II, 2013
WL 3674492 at *4. Rather than require the appointment of counsel, however, the court required
the appointment of a “qualified representative.” Id. at *3. The court defined “qualified
representative” as “(1) an attorney, (2) a law student or law graduate directly supervised by a
retained attorney, or (3) an accredited representative, all as defined in 8 C.F.R. 1292.1.” FrancoGonzalez v. Holder (Franco-Gonzalez I), 828 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Federal
regulations define an “accredited representative” as “a person who is approved by the Board to
represent aliens before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS. He or she must be a person
of good moral character who works for a specific nonprofit religious, charitable, social service, or
similar organization which has been recognized by the Board to represent aliens.” BD. OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 25 (last revised
Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1103051/download.
To
receive
accreditation, an individual must demonstrate that he or she works for a qualifying organization
that “has at its disposal adequate knowledge, information, and experience” in immigration law and
procedure and the qualifying organization must “set forth the nature and extent of the proposed
representative’s experience and knowledge of immigration and naturalization law and
procedure.” 8 C.F.R. § 1292.2(a), (d) (2017).
168. Jie Lin, 377 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
169. Id. at 1027.
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Nevertheless, no federal court has held that minor respondents in
removal proceedings have a categorical due process right to
counsel.170 In the most recent, and directly on point, case, a minor who
appeared in immigration court accompanied only by his mother
asserted on appeal a due process right to appointed counsel.171 Sitting
en banc, the Ninth Circuit declined to address the constitutional
claim.172 Judge Paez authored a concurrence that would have decided
the right to appointed counsel claim, and would have recognized the
right under the Mathews balancing test.173
PART III: THE THEORY APPLIED TO IMMIGRATION REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
Part I articulated a theory for a due process right to counsel for
child litigants. It drew on society’s and the law’s longstanding and
renewed special concern for children, and the distinguishing
characteristics of youth. Part II showed that the law regarding the right
of child litigants to counsel generally coheres with the theory
advanced here. One notable exception, involving tens of thousands of
child litigants annually, are immigration removal (deportation)
proceedings. This Part argues that, because immigration removal
proceedings are complex, adversarial proceedings in which significant
liberty interests are at stake, and the respondent faces a trained

170. Cf. Partial Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Franco-Gonzalez II, No. 10-cv-02211DMG-DTB, 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (holding that non-citizens in removal
proceedings who are incompetent due to mental disabilities are entitled to a qualified representative
as a reasonable accommodation under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
171. C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
172. Id. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the immigration court because the immigration
judge failed to advise the minor respondent that he was apparently eligible for a form of relief from
removal. Id. The court avoided deciding the fully-briefed right to appointed counsel claim by noting
that C.J.L.G. had since secured counsel and would be represented before the Immigration Court on
remand. Id. Strikingly, C.J.L.G.’s case demonstrates exactly why child respondents need lawyers
to ensure the fairness of their proceedings. Neither the presence of a friendly adult nor the
immigration judge’s duty to develop the record were sufficient to prevent error. Moreover, if
C.J.L.G. had not secured counsel after he was ordered deported, the error in his case would have
never come to light. He would have been just another child deported after an unfair hearing.
Nevertheless, because of C.J.L.G.’s fortune in securing a lawyer, and the Ninth Circuit’s
unwillingness to address the right to appointed counsel issues, thousands of children who do not
share C.J.L.G.’s good luck will continue to go without a lawyer in proceedings that are just as likely
as his to be unfair.
173. Id. at 629 (Paez, J., concurring).
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prosecutor, fairness demands that child respondents be provided with
counsel.174
A. Significant Interests at Stake
Numerous courts have acknowledged that “[t]he private liberty
interests involved in deportation proceedings are indisputably
substantial.”175 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he impact of
deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not greater than
the imposition of a criminal sentence.”176 Removal proceedings, like
delinquency proceedings, can involve secure detention pending
resolution of the case.177 They can result not only in separation of the
juvenile from family and community, but in deportation, a
consequence more severe than any that a juvenile court can impose.178
The severity of the potential sanction is magnified in cases involving
children seeking asylum, where removal may place their lives in
danger.179 In short, like delinquency proceedings and dependency
proceedings,180 where juveniles have a right to appointed counsel,
substantial liberty interests are at stake for child respondents in
removal proceedings.181
174. Other scholars have asserted a similar claim, though typically arguing for a right to
appointed counsel within the context of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See, e.g.,
Representation in Removal Proceedings, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1678 (2013) (“The group with
the strongest claim to a right to appointed counsel based on Supreme Court precedent is juvenile
noncitizens.”); Linda K. Hill, The Right to be Heard: Voicing the Due Process Right to Counsel
for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41, 44 (2011); Good, supra note
15, at 156.
175. See, e.g., Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004).
176. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945).
177. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 298 (1993) (noting existence of agreement limiting, but
not prohibiting, secure detention of child immigrants); see also Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering
Brief at 2–8, Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863 (2017) (No. 17-55208) (describing
immigrant children held in secure custody pending their removal proceedings).
178. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (recognizing “[t]he severity of
deportation—the equivalent of banishment or exile”).
179. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)
(“Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete with danger when the alien makes
a claim that he or she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home
country.”).
180. Compare Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Dependency of MSR &
TSR), 271 P.3d 234, 242 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (“[T]he child in a dependency or termination
proceeding may well face the loss of a physical liberty . . . .”), with Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284 (1922) (Deportation “deprives [the individual] of liberty” and may “result also in loss of
both property and life, or all that makes life worth living.”), and Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154
(acknowledging that in deportation proceedings, “the liberty of an individual is at stake”).
181. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154.
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Yet, the right to appointed counsel for juveniles is not limited to
the juvenile delinquency context. As shown above, child litigants have
a right to appointed counsel in a variety of civil proceedings, some of
which do not carry the potential for detention or family separation.182
Removal proceedings involve no less significant interests than those
in which child litigants have a right to appointed counsel.
B. Adversarial Proceeding Against Trained Government Counsel
Immigration removal proceedings are adversarial proceedings—
they are initiated with a charging document, in which the government
asserts and must prove allegations against the respondent. In removal
proceedings, the government presents its case through trained legal
counsel. Numerous courts have considered the adversarial nature of
the proceedings in deciding whether due process requires appointment
of counsel.183 As the Supreme Court observed, “[w]here an
individual’s liberty interest assumes sufficiently weighty
constitutional significance, and the State by a formal and adversarial
proceeding seeks to curtail that interest, the right to counsel may be
necessary to ensure fundamental fairness.”184 Moreover, the presence
of government counsel in a proceeding favors a right to appointed
counsel.185
182. Numerous state and federal courts have relied on Gault to recognize a right to appointed
counsel in civil proceedings. See, e.g., Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (1st Cir. 1973)
(applying Gault to sexually dangerous civil commitment proceedings, and commenting, “Although
the full panoply of criminal due process is not necessarily applicable to c. 123A proceedings . . .
we follow the Supreme Court’s directive in In re Gault, . . . not to allow the ‘civil’ label to deflect
us from the fundamental interest at stake.”); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 395–96 (10th Cir.
1968) (civil commitment proceedings); State v. Collman, 497 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Or. Ct. App. 1972)
(same).
183. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (“[W]here the prescribed procedure involves informal decisionmaking without the
trappings of an adversarial trial-type proceeding, counsel has not been a requisite
of due process.”); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) (“The requirement
of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of the hearing. Where
the proceeding is noncriminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and
the government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and
educated, . . . and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does
not require representation by counsel.”).
184. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37.
185. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448–49 (2011) (explicitly noting that its holding
rejecting a due process claim to appointed counsel in civil contempt cases does not apply to
proceedings where the government is likely to have counsel); Wasson, 382 F.2d at 812 (“[W]here
the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does not proceed
through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and educated, . . . and where the other
aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation
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Indeed, removal proceedings are arguably more adversarial than
juvenile delinquency proceedings.186 The most notable difference
between juvenile court proceedings and removal proceedings is that
one is brought for the benefit of the respondent (juvenile delinquency
proceedings), and the other is not. This difference is most evident at
disposition, after the charges are proven. In delinquency proceedings,
the government must show that the juvenile is in need of supervision,
treatment, or confinement, and the judge is to choose the least
restrictive alternative consistent with the needs and best interest of the
respondent and the need to protect the community.187 Similarly, the
government in dependency proceedings, status offense proceedings,
and judicial bypass hearings, acts with the child litigant’s best interests
in mind.188 There is no comparable parens patriae or best interest
superstructure to removal proceedings, and no obligation on the part
of the judge to choose the least restrictive outcome or one that is in the
best interest of the child respondent.189 To the contrary, once
removability is shown, the respondent bears the burden in removal
proceedings to show eligibility for relief and convince a judge to
favorably exercise discretion in her favor.190
Of course, adversariness is not a requirement for a right to
appointed counsel. Judicial bypass proceedings, where most juveniles
receive appointed counsel, do not involve accusations of wrongful
by counsel.”); State ex rel. Cody v. Toner, 456 N.E.2d 813, 814 (Ohio 1983) (holding that denial
of court-appointed counsel for an indigent paternity defendant who faces the state as an adversary
violated due process).
186. In denying juvenile respondents a right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings, the
Supreme Court stated that it did not want to “remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary
process.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
187. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2(2)(a) (McKinney 2012) (“[I]n determining an
appropriate order [of disposition] . . . the court shall order the least restrictive available
alternative . . . which is consistent with the needs and best interests of the respondent and the need
for protection of the community.”); In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (Ill. 2004)
(“[I]n juvenile delinquency proceedings, the sentencing hearing is a best-interests hearing, albeit
one in which the best interests of both the juvenile and the public are considered.”).
188. See, e.g., In re Interest of Karlie D., 811 N.W.2d 214, 224 (Neb. 2012) (“The foremost
purpose and objective of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is to promote and protect the juvenile’s best
interests, and the code must be construed to assure the rights of all juveniles to care and
protection.”).
189. Cf. In re Dependency of S.K-P., 401 P.3d 442 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (denying a
constitutional due process claim for appointed counsel in dependency proceedings because the child
protective aim of dependency proceedings meant that the child’s relationship with the state in such
proceedings was not adversarial), aff’d sub nom, In re Dependency of E.H., 427 P.3d 587 (Wash.
2018).
190. 8 U.S.C. 1229(c)(4)(A) (2012).
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conduct by the minor that will be proven by a trained prosecutor.
Indeed, there is no party adverse to the minor in judicial bypass
hearings. Nor may they result in court-ordered separation from family
or any kind of detention or court-ordered supervision. Nevertheless,
the vast majority of states that provide judicial bypass hearings
mandate the appointment of counsel, and all make the appointment of
a lawyer for the minor possible.191
C. Complex Governing Law
“Courts have repeatedly recognized . . . that the immigration laws
are ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.’”192
According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “[a] lawyer is often
the only person who [can] thread the [immigration-law] labyrinth.”193
While complexity of the governing law has not been an articulated
reason for providing child litigants a right to appointed counsel, the
complexity of immigration law further underscores the need for
appointed counsel for child respondents.
That an immigration judge has a duty to explain procedures,
develop the record, and identify possible relief does not diminish the
need for appointed counsel for child litigants.194 These obligations are
not insignificant, but they are not sufficient to ensure that the
proceedings are fair for child litigants. Immigration judges cannot
conduct independent fact investigation outside of hearings on the
record, as a lawyer would do. Immigration judges cannot interview
child respondents ex parte in an environment more conducive to
disclosure of private facts than an open courtroom, as a child’s counsel
would do.195 Simply put, whatever laudable efforts immigration
judges may make in individual proceedings to develop the record and
enable the respondent to understand the proceedings cannot make up
for the incapacity of child litigants to assert their rights and present
their cases.
191. See supra, Part II(E).
192. Baltazar-Alcazar v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir.
2004).
193. Id.
194. Immigration judges have an affirmative duty to develop a clear record for appeal. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2), (b) (2019); see also Jacinto v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 208 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an IJ has an independent
obligation to “fully and fairly develop the record”).
195. Chris Newlin et al., Child Forensic Interviewing: Best Practices, JUV. JUST. BULL.,
Sept. 2015, https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/pubs/248749.pdf.
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On account of the law’s special concern for vulnerable minors
and the broad consensus favoring appointed counsel for juvenile
litigants, the absence of provisions for appointed counsel for juveniles
in immigration removal proceedings is anomalous. Not only are they
adversarial proceedings that involve complex statutory, constitutional,
and procedural issues, they carry with them the potential for a
consequence more severe than any civil proceeding in which juveniles
already enjoy a right to appointed counsel. Given the potentially dire
consequences of removal proceedings, no sound justification exists to
exclude immigration removal proceedings from that consensus.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Felix Frankfurter put it long ago: “Children have a very
special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their
phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if
uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s duty towards
children.”196 Consistent with this approach, a substantial body of
doctrine recognizes that minor litigants are entitled to counsel in civil
proceedings when significant interests are at stake. Some of these
proceedings involve allegations of wrongdoing, but not all of them do.
Some of these proceedings can result in separation from family and
deprivations of liberty, but not all of them do. Some of these
proceedings are adversarial, with the government represented by
trained prosecutors, but not all of them are. Indeed, some of the
proceedings do not even involve an opposing party. What they all
share are child litigants. And common sense and science tell us that
children are simply unable to represent themselves in judicial
proceedings.
Immigration removal proceedings are adversarial, they are
complex, they put the respondent’s liberty interest at stake, and they
are presented by a trained prosecutor on behalf of the government.
Consistent with decades of jurisprudence, a broad national consensus
on the imperative of counsel for children, and the theory outlined here,
child litigants in removal proceedings should be provided with
counsel.

196. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

